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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
	  
I BACKGROUND  
	  
The Southern African Development Community Treaty1 established the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) in Windhoek, Namibia on the 17th of 
August 19922. The Treaty succeeded the then Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was aimed at ending dependency on the 
South African apartheid regime3. The new treaty embraced for the greater part, 
economic development goals which include; economic liberation, economic 
integration and development through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance 
of human rights and the rule of law as stipulated in its preamble.4 SADC has fifteen 
member states and as an international organization,5 it possesses legal personality 
with the capacity and power to enter into a contract, acquire, own or dispose of 
movable or immovable property and to sue and be sued.6 The principles of SADC 
are contained in Article 4 of the Treaty, these principles includes among others; 
sovereign equality of all Member States; human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law and peaceful settlement of disputes.7 The objectives of the Treaty are outlined in 
Article 5 and one of the objectives is to consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, 
peace, security and stability and in order to achieve this SADC has to create 
institutions that are appropriate and relevant mechanisms for the mobilization of 
necessary resources for the implementation of the programs and operations of SADC 
and its institutions.8 Furthermore, there is a general undertaking by Member States to 
take all necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of national law and to co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty (hereafter ‘SADC Treaty’). 
2 Article 2(1) SADC Treaty.  
3 SADC ‘Towards Common Future’, available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-
and-treaty/, accessed 8 of October 2013. 
4 Some of these objectives are set out in art 5 (a)-(k) SADC Treaty. 
5 Article 3(1) SADC Treaty. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Article 4(a)-(e) SADC Treaty. 
8 Article 5(2) (c) SADC Treaty. 
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operate with and assist institutions of SADC in the performance of their duties9 with 
the main aim being to attain regional and economic integration.  
The SADC region has been established pursuant to the African Union`s 
continental goal of integration and economic growth. The EAC Treaty provides that 
the African Economic Community (EAC) shall be established through the 
coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs).10 The AEC Treaty does not make 
reference to the status of the RECs, but be that as it may, most commentators of 
African integration assumes that the RECs are the ‘building blocks’ of the agenda of 
economic integration in Africa.11 Furthermore, the AEC Treaty provides that 
Member States ‘shall foster cooperative arrangements with other regional and 
international organisations whose activities have a bearing on the objectives of the 
Treaty’. Therefore, SADC as one of Africa`s sub-regional organizations drives 
progressively towards this goal. The SADC Treaty contains details on its 
relationship with the AEC apart from a reference to cooperation with regional and 
international organizations.12 More so, the AEC makes it clear in stating that the 
AEC is an ‘integral part’, of the African Union.13  The Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (CAAU) further provides that its provisions take precedence over and 
supersede any inconsistency or contrary provisions of the AEC Treaty.14 This 
reference creates an organic relationship between the SADC, AU and the AEC.  
Against this background the Abuja Treaty demonstrated its desire to promote 
regional communities as it provides that, ‘… Member States undertake to strengthen 
the existing regional economic communities and to establish new communities 
where they do not exist in order to ensure the gradual establishment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Article 6(1) SADC Treaty.  
10 Article 2(1) African Economic Community Treaty (AEC Treaty). 
11 R Oppong Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2001) 180.  
12 Article 24 SADC Treaty. 
13 Article 98(1) AEC Treaty. 
14 Article 33(2) AEC Treaty. 
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Community’.15 As a result, SADC was established in the southern part of the African 
continent and consists of fifteen Member States.16 
 
II SADC Tribunal 
	  
The SADC Treaty established eight institutions17 and it also caters for the creation of 
any other institutions when the need arises.18 The Summit of Heads of State or 
Government is a supreme policy-making institution of SADC which consists of the 
Heads of State or Governments of all Member States.19 Some of the major duties of 
the Summit is to be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the 
functions of SADC;20 adopt legal instruments for the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty;21 to elect a chairperson and a deputy chairperson of SADC 
from among its members for one year on the basis of rotation22 and to make 
decisions which shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.23 Furthermore, the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation is another SADC institution24 
of which its structure, functions, powers and procedures of the Organ and other 
related matters shall be prescribed in a separate Protocol25 and again the decisions of 
this organ are to be taken by consensus.26  
The Council of Ministers is one of the SADC institutions27 which consists of 
one Minister from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for Foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Article 28(1) AEC Treaty.  
16 Member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe 
17 Article 9(1) (a-h).  
18 Article 9(2) SADC Treaty. 
19 Article 10 (1) SADC Treaty. 
20 Article 10 (2) SADC Treaty. 
21 Article 10(3) SADC Treaty. 
22 Article 10(4) SADC Treaty. 
23 Article 10(9) SADC Treaty. 
24 Article. 9(1) (b) SADC Treaty. 
25 Article 10A (5) SADC Treaty. 
26 Article 10A (6) SADC Treaty. 
27 Article 9(1) (c) SADC Treaty. 
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or External Affairs.28 The council is endowed with various important duties in the 
organization which includes inter alia, to oversee the implementation of the policies 
of SADC and the proper execution of its programmes;29 advise the Summit on 
matters of overall policy and ensure efficient and harmonious functioning and 
development of SADC;30 recommend, for approval to the Summit, the establishment 
of directorates, committees, other institutions and organs31 as well as to develop and 
implement the SADC common agenda and strategic priorities.32  
The Treaty also provides for the establishment of other institutions like the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers;33 the Standing Committee of Officials;34 the 
Secretariat35 and SADC National Committees as institutions of the SADC 
organization.36  
Furthermore, the Treaty established the SADC Tribunal.37 In addition the 
Treaty stipulates that a Protocol to the Tribunal must provide for the “composition, 
powers, functions, procedures and other related matters” of the Tribunal.38 Hence, 
the Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure thereof were established39 
on 7 August 2000. The protocol regulates the Tribunal`s composition,40 the 
processes of appointment and also dismissal of members,41 and its powers 
concerning  legal decisions, reviews, representation, interim measures, fees and legal 
aid42, enforcement of decisions43, and other aspects of international law in the region.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Article 1(1) SADC Treaty. 
29 Article 11(2) (b) SADC Treaty. 
30 Article 11(2) (c) SADC Treaty. 
31 Article 11(2) (f) SADC Treaty. 
32 Article 11(2) (j) SADC Treaty. 
33 Article 9(1) (d) SADC Treaty. 
34 Article 9(1) (e) SADC Treaty. 
35 Article 9(1) (f) SADC Treaty. 
36 Article 9(1) (h) SADC Treaty. 
37 Article 9(1) (g) SADC Treaty. 
38 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
39 Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure (SADC Protocol). 
40 Article 3 SADC Protocol. 
41 Article 4 SADC Protocol. 
42 Article 31 SADC Protocol. 
43 Article 32 SADC Protocol. 
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The primary purpose of the Tribunal is to ensure adherence to and the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments 
and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it44. It has been 
pronounced by the Treaty that the Protocol to the Tribunal is an integral part of the 
Treaty and this distinguishes the Tribunal as playing a significant role within the 
region.45 The basis of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction lies in both the Treaty and the 
Protocol respectively. Article 32 of the SADC Treaty permits  reference to the 
SADC Tribunal of ‘…any dispute arising from the interpretation, application or 
validity of Protocols or other subsidiary instruments made under this Treaty, which 
cannot be settled amicably’. More so, Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty states that 
the Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure observance of and the appropriate 
interpretation of the SADC Treaty and other subsidiary instruments and to decide 
upon such matters as may be referred to it. Furthermore, Article 14 of the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol gives the SADC Tribunal jurisdiction over ‘all disputes and all 
applications referred to it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which 
relate to various SADC instruments. In terms of Article 15 the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over legal and natural persons and member states and Article 15(2) 
subsequently contains an exhaustion of local remedies rule, in regard to natural 
persons.  
The Tribunal also functions as a labour tribunal46. More so, it has an appellate 
function in relation, for instance, to the trade panels established in terms of Article 
31(b) of the SADC Protocol on Trade47. The Tribunal also plays a role of advisory 
function as stipulated in Article 20 of the Tribunal Protocol. In more general terms it 
is conspicuous that the SADC Tribunal is expected to serve as a key institution in the 
SADC legal and institutional integration process.  
On the 18th of August 2005, The Summit of Heads of State which is the 
Supreme Policy Institution of SADC, pursuant to Article 4(4) of the Protocol on the 
Tribunal, appointed the members of the Tribunal during its Summit of Heads of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Article 16(1) SADC Treaty. 
45 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
46 Article 19 SADC Protocol. 
47 Article 14(b) & 20A SADC Protocol. 
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State and Government held in Gaborone, Botswana.48 On 18 November 2005 the 
Tribunal was inaugurated and the judges were sworn in. The Tribunal received its 
first cases in 2007 among which most of them were related to labour disputes.49 The 
Campbell50 case was the first matter brought before the Tribunal which dealt with 
issues of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Tribunal ruled against 
Zimbabwe in this matter and ordered Zimbabwe to, among other things, compensate 
the applicants for their confiscated farms. Zimbabwe refused to comply with the 
decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal referred the matter to the Summit of the 
Heads of States and Governments for them to impose appropriate sanctions on 
Zimbabwe.  The summit responded by a de facto suspension of the Tribunal.  
The suspension of the Tribunal and the refusal of Zimbabwe to enforce the 
Tribunal decisions indicate that the Tribunal is plagued by various problems, 
especially in relation to the enforcement of its decisions. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the Tribunal is pivotal for the pursuit of sub-regional integration of SADC members 
as it constitutes an integral part of the Treaty.51 Therefore, the de facto suspension of 
the Tribunal may have a negative effect on the goals of SADC to ‘…promote 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development that 
will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance 
the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration.’52 Hence, it is the primary 
objective of this dissertation to conduct an analysis of the various aspects of the 
Tribunal and its decision in the Campbell case in order to generate recommendations 
for the strengthening of this judicial institution of SADC pursuant to regional 
integration.  
Therefore, this dissertation will consist of four parts. The first chapter is an 
introductory chapter. The second chapter will discuss various aspects of the Tribunal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 O Ruppel and F Bangamwabo ‘The SADC Tribunal: a legal analysis of its mandate and role in 
regional integration’ (2008) Vol 8 MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA YEARBOOK 179.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Other v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No. 02/2007. 
(hereafter ‘Campbell’ ). 
51 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
52 Article 5(1) (a) SADC Treaty. 
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comprehensively, such as the appointment of judges, jurisdiction, locus standi and 
enforcement and execution of its decisions. The third chapter will present a critical 
analysis of the Campbell53 case and the outcome of the decision of the Tribunal and 
subsequent events that followed thereafter which includes the refusal of Zimbabwe 
to enforce its decision, meeting of the Summit and a subsequent de facto suspension 
of the Tribunal. This chapter will also reflect on the Fick Case(s)54 as decided by the 
High Court of South Africa, Supreme Court of South Africa and later by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. This discussion will vindicate the 
supranational character of the Tribunal as a regional judicial institution and will 
reflect on its general mandate to protect human rights. The fourth chapter will focus 
on the Study of the Tribunal commissioned by the SADC Summit as well as the 
importance of the African Commission (AC) and the African Court of Human and 
Peoples Rights in preserving the rule of law and finally, the fifth chapter will provide 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Campbell op cit (n50). 
54 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick (47945/10, 72184/10, 77881/09) [2011] 
ZAGPPAC 76 (6 2011). (hereafter ‘Fick’ ). 
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The Southern African Development Community Treaty (Treaty) provides for the 
establishment of the SADC Tribunal (the Tribunal) to ensure adherence to, and 
proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary 
instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.55 The 
Treaty also provides for the establishment of the Protocol on the Tribunal (the 
Protocol) that sets out the composition, powers, procedures of the Tribunal and any 
other related matters.56 It is therefore the primary purpose of this chapter to provide a 
detailed legal exposition of the Tribunal in order to understand the powers, role and 
function of the Tribunal and its significance in strengthening the rule of law and 
democracy pursuant to the promotion of human rights in the context of regional 
integration.57 Thus, this chapter will also demonstrate that the Tribunal is an 
important institution for the regional integration project. 
 
a) The Tribunal 
	  
The Tribunal is the judicial institution of SADC, formally inaugurated in November 
2005. Primarily, the Tribunal is intended to decide upon matters and disputes that 
arise between Member States and to ensure adherence to the SADC Treaty.58 The 
Tribunal is mandated to apply the SADC Treaty, the Tribunal Protocol and other 
Protocols that form part of the Treaty and all other SADC subsidiary instruments that 
are adopted by the Summit, by the Council or by any other recognisable institution 
or organ of the Community pursuant to the Treaty or Protocols thereto.59 In doing so 
the Tribunal should develop its own community jurisprudence with regard to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Article 9 SADC Treaty. 
56 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
57 W Scholtz and G Ferreira ‘Much Ado About Nothing? The SADC Tribunal’s Quest for the Rule of 
Law Pursuant to Regional Integration’ (2011) Vol 1 HEIDELBERG INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 331-358. 
58 Article 9 & 16 SADC Treaty. 
59 Article 21(a) SADC Protocol. 
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applicable Treaties, general principles and rules of public international law and any 
rules and principles of the law of Member States.60 
More so, it is important to note that the Tribunal is only restricted to questions 
of SADC law and that its rulings are central to the interpretation and application of 
SADC norms, and not national laws of Member States.61 Thus the SADC Tribunal 
has no power to make determinations on national laws or to review the decisions of 
domestic courts as ‘law’.62 Be that as it may, it is true that the Tribunal may 
adjudicate national laws and decisions of domestic courts based on those laws in a 
matter involving a natural or legal person brought before the Tribunal on the 
condition that such an individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies.63 In 
terms of Art 16(2) the Tribunal forms an integral part of the Treaty.64 A descriptive 
outline of the Tribunal is instructive at this stage. 
 
(i) Composition of the Tribunal and appointment of Judges 
	  
The protocol provides for the composition and qualification of the judges of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal shall be made up of not less than ten members who are 
appointed by member states but who also possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial positions in their respective states or who are 
jurists of recognized competence.65 The Tribunal shall be constituted by three 
Members; provided that the Tribunal may decide to constitute a full bench composed 
of five members66 and no two or more members may, at any time, be nationals of the 
same state.  
(ii) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Article 21(b) SADC Protocol. 
61 Article 14 (b) SADC Protocol. 
62 Lorand Bartels ‘Review of the Role, Responsibilities and Terms of Reference of the SADC 
Tribunal’, Draft Report 18. ( hereafter ‘Bartels’) 
63 Article 15(2) SADC Protocol. 
64 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
65 Article 3(1) SADC Protocol. 
66 Article 3(3) SADC Protocol. 
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The basis of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction lies in both the Treaty and Part III of the 
Protocol respectively. Article 32 of the SADC Treaty states that ‘Any dispute arising 
from the interpretation, application or validity of Protocols or other subsidiary 
instruments made under this Treaty, which cannot be settled amicably, shall be 
referred to the Tribunal’. More so, Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty stipulates the 
purpose of the Tribunal and Article 14 of the SADC Tribunal Protocol, grants the 
SADC Tribunal jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and the Protocol in relation to various SADC 
instruments. 
More so, the Tribunal has jurisdiction on the interpretation, application or to 
ensure validity of the Protocols, and on all subsidiary instruments adopted within the 
framework of the community, and acts of the institutions of the community.67 The 
scope of the Tribunal`s jurisdiction extends over disputes between States, and 
between natural or legal persons and States.68 No natural or legal person shall bring 
an action against a State unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is 
unable to proceed under domestic jurisdiction.69 The Tribunal also has jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings in proceedings of any kind and between any parties before 
the courts or Tribunals of States.70 Furthermore, the Tribunal shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes between the States and the Community. Such disputes 
may be referred to the Tribunal either by the State concerned or by the competent 
institution or organ of the Community.71 It also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over 
all disputes between the Community and its staff relating to their conditions of 
employment,72 and it enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, which 
may be requested by the Summit or by the Council of the SADC organization.73  
 
(iii) Legal status of the Tribunal 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Article 14(b) SADC Protocol. 
68 Article 15(1) SADC Protocol. 
69 Article 15(2) SADC Protocol. 
70 Article 16(1) SADC Protocol. 
71 Article 17 SADC Protocol. 
72 Article 19 SADC Protocol. 
73 Article 20 SADC Protocol. 
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First of all, it should be borne in mind that SADC is an international organization74 
and the Tribunal is an integral part of the Treaty.75 This therefore means that the 
Tribunal is an organ of SADC and its legal status stems from the Treaty. As an 
international organization, SADC is endowed with legal personality and the capacity 
and power to enter into a contract, acquire, own or dispose of movable or immovable 
property and to sue and be sued.76 Therefore, the Tribunal shall have such legal 
capacity as is necessary for the proper exercise of its functions in the territory of 
each Member State.77  
 
(iv) Decisions of the Tribunal 
	  
The Treaty provides that decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.78 The 
SADC Tribunal issues ‘decisions’ on matters within its jurisdiction .These decisions 
are concerned with the interpretation of the applicable law and the application of the 
applicable law to the facts at issue. It follows that the SADC Tribunal has the power 
to make decisions as to whether a given party has violated a relevant obligation.79 
More so, the Protocol provides that decisions made by the Tribunal shall be 
enforceable upon the parties to the dispute in respect of that particular case and 
enforceable within the territories of the States concerned.80 The Protocol obliges all 
Member States and institutions of the community to take forthwith all measures 
necessary to ensure execution of the decisions of the Tribunal. In the Member states, 
the Protocol states that, the law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in force in the territory of the State in which the 
judgment is to be enforced, shall govern enforcement.81 This is also echoed by the 
Treaty where it provides that Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures 
to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Article 3(1) SADC Treaty. 
75 Article 16(2) SADC Treaty. 
76 Article 3(1) SADC Protocol. 
77 Article 3(2) SADC Protocol. 
78 Article 16(5) SADC Treaty. 
79 Article 16(1) SADC Protocol. 
80 Article 32(3) SADC Protocol. 
81 Article 32(1) SADC Protocol. 
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any measure likely to jeopardize the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of 
its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.82 
First of all, it is important to identify two forms in which decisions of the 
Tribunal are enforced. There are two distinct types of enforcement mechanisms 
applicable to SADC Tribunal decisions: first, there is a mechanism for registration 
and enforcement of Tribunal decisions within the legal orders of the SADC Member 
States; secondly, there is a mechanism for enforcing decisions at the international 
level, by reference to the SADC Tribunal and the Summit.83  
The Protocol further states that the decisions of the Tribunal shall be taken by a 
majority84 and that it may also give a decision in default.85 However, when the 
Tribunal is giving the decision in default, it should satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction over the dispute and that the claim is well-founded in fact and law.86 Be 
that as it may, a party against whom a default decision is made may apply to the 
Tribunal for the rescission of such decision. The applicant shall set out the grounds 
to the satisfaction of the court for such application.87 
Article 26 of the Protocol provides for the application for review of the 
Tribunal decision on the condition that the decision has been made by the Tribunal 
based upon the discovery of some fact which by its nature might have had a decisive 
influence on the decision if it had been known to the Tribunal at the time the 
decision was given, but which fact at the time was unknown to both the Tribunal and 
the party making the application; provided always that such ignorance was not due to 
negligence. 
 
b) Relationship between the Tribunal and the National Courts 
 
(i) The role of national courts in the enforcement of decisions 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Article 6(1) SADC Treaty. 
83 Bartels op cit (n62) at 38. 
84 Article 24(2) SADC Protocol. 
85 Article 25(1) SADC Protocol. 
86 Article 25(2) SADC Protocol. 
87 Article 25(3) SADC Protocol. 
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The international nature of SADC equally extents to the SADC Tribunal and as such, 
the national courts of Member States are therefore expected to respect the Tribunal 
and its decisions. This is the starting point for a reflection of the role of national 
courts in the enforcement of decisions of the Tribunal. 
 It has been argued that, courts within national jurisdictions have a pivotal role 
to play in as far as enforcement of international rule of law is concerned and they 
have a potential to improve state compliance with international law.88 More so, it 
should be clear that the development and enforcement of international law is 
dependent upon the condition that such decisions of the of the international courts or 
Tribunals are accepted and enforced by the government of the states concerned and 
this is when the role of domestic courts becomes relevant.89 Unfortunately, it has not 
been the case with the Tribunal. The Campbell90 case which the Tribunal had to 
preside over for the very first time, demonstrated rather a strained relationship 
between the Tribunal and the domestic courts. When the Tribunal ruled against 
Zimbabwe in which a human rights question was an issue, the Zimbabwean 
government refused to enforce the Tribunal`s ruling. Under international law, a 
national court is considered to be an organ of the State, just as are the legislature and 
executive.91 Therefore, the Tribunal, in essence, produces decisions with effect in 
national jurisdictions through the civil law or common law enforcement of decisions. 
This entails that the national courts of Member states should at least embrace and 
respect the decisions of the Tribunal as mandated by the Treaty. It is clear therefore 
that domestic courts play a pivotal role in giving effect and force of law to any 
decisions made by the Tribunal. It is also true that the enforcement power of the 
Tribunal is dependent on the domestic courts.  
(ii) The role of the Tribunal and national courts in the global network of courts. 
	  
Another medium for enhancing community-state relations is the national courts. 
They provide an avenue for giving domestic effect to community law apart from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 M Kumm ‘International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the Limits of 
the Internationalist Model’ (2003) Vol 19 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44.  
89 Scholtz & Ferreira op cit (n57) at 34. 
90 Campbell op cit (n50).  
91 ‘Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human. Rights’ (1999) ICJ Rep 62, para 62. 
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executive and parliamentary acts such as ratifications, publications of community 
instruments and administrative action.92 Therefore, having this much to offer, the 
role of national courts in the global judicial network becomes essential. The Tribunal 
has indicated its will to embrace and recognize what was dubbed as the ‘trans-
judicial communication of courts’ by Professor Slaughter.93 In formulating its 
decision in the Campbell94 case, the Tribunal made reference to various international 
and foreign laws95 in order to present itself as an actor among other global courts 
which pursue human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Thus, Southern African 
courts also have a role to play in the progressive realization of this universal goal. 
The Tribunal have taken into account some of the decisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights,96 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), 97and it generously made reference to the decisions of other regional 
Tribunals98, national courts99, quasi-judicial bodies100 and expert bodies101 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Oppong op cit (n11). 
93 A Slaughter ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) Vol 44 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 191. 
94 Campbell op cit (n50). 
95 See Campbell op cit (n50) at 17-26. 
96 Article 26 European Convention on Human Rights. 
97 Campbell op cit (n50) at 20. 
98 Citations included: European Court of Human Rights, Golder v United Kingdom (1975), Philis v 
Greece (1991) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-9/97 of 6 
October 1987. 
99 The Tribunal referred to the House of Lords, Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas v Ryan (1980) A.C. 718 and Jackson v Attorney-General UKHL 56 (2006) 1 A.C.262); the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 
and Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) as well as the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe (Commercial Farmers’ 
Union v Minister of Lands 2001 (2) SA 925 (ZSC) and Mike Campbell (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement (SC 49/07)). 
100 Cf. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (Constitutional Rights Project, Civil 
Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Comm. No. 140/94, 141/94 145/95 
(1999); Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum/Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 245 (2002), Human Rights 
Committee (General Comment No. 18), The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights is 
seen as a quasi-judicial body. See further, discussion: R Murray The African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights and International Law (2000) 143, the complexity on the question whether the 
Human Rights Committee has quasi-judicial powers. See F Martin, S Schnably International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law: Treaties, Cases and Analysis (2006) 7. See further, J Crawford ‘The 
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established by UN organs.102 The Tribunal also made reference to international law 
such as the United Nations Charter,103 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,104 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights105 and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All forms of Racial Discrimination106 in which it confirmed that discrimination is 
prohibited. 
Therefore, this form of communication within the global judicial sphere is 
essential for the protection of human rights as well as enriching the tribunals that 
enforce them with solid jurisprudence. The trans-judicial communication 
demonstrated by the tribunal establishes a community of courts,107 including; 
domestic, regional and international courts, which operate on a modicum of common 
ground. Thus the community of courts acts pursuant to the promotion and 
preservation of democracy and the rule of law.108 More so, this form of 
communication among the courts may nurture a process of ‘collective judicial 
deliberation on a set of common problems’.109 Thus, the role of national courts may 
not be isolated from the global judicial communication; instead it is essential to 
integrate it into this system in order to ensure the protection of universal human 
rights on a national, regional and international level. 
(iii)  The Tribunal and the objective of regional integration 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
UN Human Rights Treaty System’ P Alston and J Crawford (eds) The Future of UN Human Rights 
Monitoring, (2003) Vol 47 JORNAL OF AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 2. 
101 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General Comment No.16). S Leckie 
‘The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a System Needing 
Reform’ 129-144 in P Alston and J Crawford (eds.) The Future of UN Human Rights Monitorin 
(2003) Vol 47 JORNAL OF AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 2. 
102 The Tribunal referred also to the decisions of other entities with authority.  
103 Campbell op cit (n50) at 45. 
104 Campbell op cit (n50) at 46. 
105 Campbell op cit (n50) at 46. 
106 Campbell op cit (n50) at 47. 
107 Slaughter op cit (n93) at 192. 
108 Scholtz & Ferreira op cit (n57) at 345. 
109 Campbell op cit (n50) at 119. 
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One of the major goals of the SADC is to promote an active interdependence and 
progressive integration of the Southern African economies of Member states, for the 
mutual, relevant, balanced and equitable economic development of the region.110 In 
order to achieve this goal, the rule based community becomes a necessary 
component to drive the region towards regional integration. Thus, the Tribunal has a 
significant part in the international judicial system to protect and promote the rule of 
law in the region pursuant to sub-regional, and ultimately African integration.111 
The SADC Treaty advocates for an independent and impartial Tribunal, which 
should, when executing its mandate, promote the purposes and interests of the 
community and not merely serve the interests of certain Member states.112 Therefore, 
since the Tribunal is an integral part of the Treaty, ‘…Member States are encouraged 
to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC, 
and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its 
principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty’.113 It is therefore undeniable that the Tribunal, as a judicial 
arm of the community, plays a pivotal role in the maintenance, improvement and 
protection of the rule of law aimed towards the main integration goal. 
c) Sources of law for the Tribunal 
	  
The source of law for the Tribunal has been provided in the Protocol and provides 
that the Tribunal shall ‘apply the Treaty, the Protocol and other Protocols that form 
part of the Treaty, all subsidiary instruments adopted by the Summit, by the Council 
or by any other institution or organ of the Community pursuant to the Treaty or 
Protocols’,114 and it has been mandated to develop and improve its own Community 
jurisprudence paying particular attention and regard to applicable treaties, general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Preamble, Treaty. 
111 Scholtz & Ferreira op cit (n57) at 351. 
112In terms of Article 17 (1) Treaty “Member States shall respect the international character and 
responsibilities of SADC, the Executive Secretary and other staff of SADC, and shall not seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their functions”. Art. 17 (2), Treaty further reads that ‘the members 
of the Tribunal ... shall not seek or receive instructions from any Member States’.  
113 Article 6(1) SADC Treaty. 
114 Article 21(a) SADC Protocol. 
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principles and rules of public international law and any other rules and principles of 
the law of States.115  
The Tribunal, in fact, should make reference to other international documents 
in order to ascertain legal position in cases where the Treaty is silent.116 This 
provision states that; the Tribunal shall apply the Treaty, this Protocol and other 
Protocols that form part of the Treaty, all subsidiary instruments adopted by the 
Summit, by the Council or by any other institution or organ of the Community 
pursuant to the Treaty or Protocols; and develop its own Community jurisprudence 
having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public 
international law and any rules and principles of the law of Member States.117 
Article 21118 is therefore important in that it authorizes the SADC Tribunal to 
apply equitable principles, such as estoppel, as well as the rules of treaty law, 
including rules on the interpretation of treaties and this includes, importantly, the 
rule that treaties are to be interpreted in light of any rules relevant in international 
law that are applicable in the relations between the concerned parties.119 Thus, the 
Tribunal was correct in the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty and by 
giving a ruling against the on-going compulsory land grabs in Zimbabwe. 
d) Conclusion 
	  
The Tribunal is an important judicial organ in the SADC region and as such the legal 
order, human rights, democracy and the rule of law within the region are to be 
protected and enhanced through its arm. It has been demonstrated above that there 
should be interplay between the Tribunal and the national courts of member states as 
this is crucial for the protection of human rights and the rule of law.  The Tribunal 
has also been endowed with the power to produce decisions which are both binding 
and final between the parties to the dispute and also within the territories concerned. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal plays a pivotal role in the SADC region and 
also in the realisation of the integration goal. The following chapter will discuss one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Article 21(b) SADC Protocol. 
116 Campbell op cit (n50) at 24 
117 Article 21 SADC Protocol. 
118 SADC Protocol. 
119 Bartels op cit (n62) at 19. 
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of the most important cases, famously known as Campbell.120 The Tribunal makes 
provision for generous standing as it includes the individual standing before the 
Tribunal. This provides natural persons with the locus standi before the Tribunal and 
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The SADC Tribunal in the renowned Campbell case handed down a ruling against 
Zimbabwe in which it ordered the government of Zimbabwe to refrain from further 
expropriation of land owned by the applicants and that the government should pay 
compensation to those land owners who had their farms confiscated.121 The 
government of Zimbabwe refused to comply with the Tribunal`s ruling. The 
applicants further made an attempt to approach the Tribunal for a second122 and 
third123 time to report Zimbabwe`s breach of the Tribunal`s ruling. The applicants 
wanted the Tribunal to find that Zimbabwe was in breach of its decision by refusing 
to comply and enforce the decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal found in favour of 
the applicants and held Zimbabwe in breach of the Tribunal`s ruling. Nevertheless, 
Zimbabwe repeatedly refused to enforce the Tribunal`s ruling.124  
The Campbell case was the first case brought before the Tribunal which dealt 
with issues of human rights in the context of the rule of law and democracy. 
Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the case in order to grasp the 
various aspects of the Tribunal. Thus this chapter will discuss the case in a detailed 
approach and in doing so, highlight aspects of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the right 
to access the Tribunal, locus standi, adjudication of human rights issues, and 
compensation in the case of expropriation, which will be discussed and analysed at a 
later stage. The primary purpose of this chapter therefore is to critically analyse the 
Campbell case in order to identify areas of strength and weakness of the Tribunal`s 
enforcement mechanism and to generate recommendations to that effect. 
II The Campbell Case125 
	  
In 2002, the government of Zimbabwe strengthened its land distribution program,126 
and to make sure that no contention over its undertaking, it went on to legalise this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Campbell op cit (n50) at 58. 
122 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe [2008] SADCT 2 at 59. 
123 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe [2009] SADCT No. 3/2009 




exercise by amending its constitution to make possible compulsory acquisition of 
agricultural land. The acquisition of land was to be carried out under the new law, 
Section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 17, 2005) (herein 
referred to as Amendment 17).127 When this exercise was in progress, the applicants 
(most of them white commercial farmers) made an attempt, though it was in vain, to 
secure from the court a restraining order to prevent the compulsory confiscation of 
their property. This application was dismissed by the Zimbabwean Supreme court.128 
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe dismissed the application reasoning inter alia that;  
 
‘Section 16B of the Constitution is a legitimate exercise of the legislative power 
to determine the conditions under which the power inherent in the State to 
compulsorily acquire private property in agricultural land for public purposes 
can be validly exercised.’129 
 
 In other words, the Supreme Court was of the view that compulsory 
acquisition of land was lawful and the government is undertaking this exercise 
within the boundaries of the Constitution. More so, Amendment 17 has intentionally 
ousted the court`s jurisdiction to hear all matters which relate to the acquisition of 
agricultural land and it also excluded compensation.130 Section 16B (3) (a) 
invalidates the capacity of the courts in this regard and it provides that; 
 
‘A person having any right or interest in the land – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 This exercise come about following a plethora of Constitutional amendments which started in early 
1990`s and in 2000 the government of Zimbabwe introduced another Constitutional Amendment Act 
No 6 of 2000 which sought to legitimize the invasions already taking place and to expedite the land 
reform process. See also, M Beukes  ‘Southern African events of international significance’ (2012) 
Vol. 37 SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, where events where recorded 
pertaining to Zimbabwe and where	  Tendai Biti, (the then Minister of Finance from the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) (and secretary general of the party)) gave a warning that Zimbabwe was 
heading for  a ‘bloodbath’ if Robert Mugabe went on with elections in 2011.  
127 Campbell op cit (n50) at 52. 





(a) Shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the 
State, and no   court shall entertain any such challenge.’131 
 
The applicants, Campbell and other numerous white farmers in Zimbabwe who 
had their farms confiscated by the state, and who was left with no option and no 
remedy in the country, in pursuit of justice, they approached the SADC Tribunal 




The application made to the Tribunal132 pursued among other things; to challenge the 
acquisition by the government of Zimbabwe of agricultural land and to seek an 
interim measure restricting the government of Zimbabwe from removing or allowing 
the removal of the applicants from their land pending the determination of the matter 
by the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Tribunal ordered the Respondent to pay 
compensation for land already expropriated by the Respondent.133 The Tribunal 
granted the relief sort but the respondent deliberately spurned the decision made by 
the Tribunal.  
 Campbell and others who had their farms confiscated by the government 
argued before the Tribunal that the Zimbabwean land acquisition process was racist 
and contrary to Article 6 which provides that ‘SADC and Member States shall not 
discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, 
ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability, or such other ground as may be 
determined by the Summit’.134  
The African Union Charter to which Zimbabwe subscribes to, it also prohibits 
arbitrary and racially motivated government conduct.135 The SADC Treaty stipulates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005 (Act No. 5 of 2005) (Amendment 17). 
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that SADC and its member states shall act in accordance with the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law as well as equity, balance and mutual 
benefit; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, among others.136 The complainants 
argued in their application to the Tribunal, and submitted among other things;  
 
i. That the respondent acted in breach of its obligations under the Treaty by enacting and 
implementing Amendment 17; and that, 
ii. That the applicants were denied access to the courts to challenge the legality of the 
compulsory acquisition of their lands;137 
iii. That the Zimbabwean government acted in breach of its obligations under the 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community by enacting and 
implementing Amendment 17; 
iv. That the responsible Minister failed to employ reasonable and objective criteria in 
order to establish whether the confiscated farms were reasonably necessary for 
resettlement purposes in conformity with the land reform programme; 
v. That the applicants were denied access to the Zimbabwean courts to challenge the 
legality of the compulsory acquisition of their lands; 
vi. That the applicants had suffered racial discrimination insofar as they were the 
only ones whose lands have been acquired under Amendment 17; and 
vii. That the applicant was denied compensation in respect of the lands acquired 
from them.138  
The respondent, in response to the applicant’s submission, made their own 
submission contending among other things that; 
• The applicants have not been denied access to the courts. On the 
contrary, the applicants could, if they wish, seek judicial review.139  
• The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under the 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community; 
• Land is acquired from mainly white farmers who own large tracts of 
land suitable for agricultural resettlement, and this policy cannot be described 
as racist because it is brought about by colonial history; 
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• The respondent also acquired land from a few black Zimbabweans 
who possessed large tracts of land; 
• The applicants will receive compensation in terms of Amendment 17; 
• The compulsory acquisition of land is aimed at correcting inequities 
pertaining to colonially inherited land ownership; and 
• The applicants have not been denied access to the Zimbabwean courts 
as they could seek judicial review if they wish to. 
 
Against this background, the Tribunal formulated the issues to be 
determined as follows:140 
• Whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the 
application; 
• Whether or not the applicants have been denied access to the courts in 
Zimbabwe; 
• Whether or not the applicants have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race; and 
• Whether or not compensation is payable for the land compulsorily 




The Tribunal`s findings on jurisdiction was based on Article 4(c) of the Treaty and 
the Tribunal found that it has necessary jurisdiction in respect of any matter 
concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and furthermore, the 
Tribunal stated it clearly that Zimbabwe cannot rely on its national law in order to 
circumvent its SADC Treaty obligations.141 More so, Article 16(1) of the SADC 
Treaty provides that the primary mandate of the Tribunal is as follows;  ‘[t]he 
Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of 
the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such 
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disputes as may be referred to it.’ Hence, the Tribunal concluded that it has the 
jurisdiction to entertain this matter.142  
Furthermore, the SADC Tribunal was set up and entrusted with a duty to 
protect the interests and rights of SADC Member States and their citizens, and to 
develop the community jurisprudence also with regard to applicable treaties, general 
principles and rules of public international law.143 Subject to the principle of 
exhaustion of local remedies, the Tribunal has the mandate to adjudicate on disputes 
between states, and between natural and legal persons of the Community.144 In the 
present case, the Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction mero metu and found that it had 
jurisdiction since the dispute in this case involves a member state and a natural and 
legal person.145 More so, the Protocol states that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
over all matters provided for in any other agreements that member states may 
conclude among themselves or within the community and that confer jurisdiction to 
the Tribunal. The Tribunal is also vested with exclusive jurisdiction in disputes 
between organs of the community or between community personnel and the 
community.146  
The responded argued that since the Supreme court had at that moment not 
delivered any judgement concerning the matter before it, the applicant cannot claim 
to have exhausted all local remedies or to state that he was not able to proceed under 
the domestic jurisdiction as required by Article 15 (2) of the Protocol to the 
Tribunal’.147 To this argument, the Tribunal responded by mentioning that the 
Protocol though pivotal in this respect, it is not the only instrument in the region 
containing the exhaustion of local remedies rule. The Tribunal made reference to the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) which states that; 
 
‘The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure 
that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to 
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the Commission that the procedure of achieving the remedies would have been 
unduly prolonged’.148  
 
The Tribunal went on to hold that, the rationale behind this rule is to grant 
domestic courts an opportunity to deal with the matter first because they are best 
placed to rule on any matter concerning municipal law.149 This rule also ensures that, 
the Tribunal is not burdened by matters which may easily be settled in the national 
courts. Be that as it may, the exhaustion of local remedies rule is qualified in so far 
as it is not applicable where domestic law offers no remedy or ineffective or where 
the procedure of getting a remedy is unduly prolonged.150  
The Tribunal referred to Amendment 17151 in terms of which the jurisdiction of 
the Zimbabwean Courts were ousted with regard to cases that concerned the 
acquisition of agricultural land by the government.152 The Tribunal reasoned that, the 
applicants were not able to institute proceedings in the Zimbabwean Courts as was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.153 In this regard, the Tribunal 
concluded that it is vested with the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the matter.154  
Furthermore, the applicant argued that, the Tribunal have no jurisdiction to 
decide on the validity of the land reform program in Zimbabwe. The argument of the 
respondent was based on the fact that, the Treaty does not provide standards upon 
which the Member States must be evaluated, but merely set up principles and 
objectives of SADC.155 And in the absence of such standards, the Tribunal may not 
apply these from other international documents because such practice is equivalent 
to legislating on behalf of the Member State of SADC.156  
 
The Tribunal again responded with reference to Article 21 (b) of the Protocol 
which does not only instructs the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence but also 
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enjoins it to do so by considering other applicable Treaties and general principles of 
law and rules of public international law.157 The Tribunal, in fact must –where the 
need arises, consult other international documents in order to establish a legal 
position concerning relevant matters where the Treaty is silent.158  
The Tribunal further found it needless for the Summit to enact a Protocol on 
Human Rights and agrarian reform, as advised by the respondent in its submissions, 
159 in order to give effect to the principles contained in the Treaty,160 which requires 
Member States to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law.161 Having identified that, the Tribunal found that it has capacity 
and sufficient jurisdiction to preside and rule on any matter concerning human rights, 
rule of law and democracy which appeared to be decided in the application before 
the Tribunal.162 
 
(ii) Right to the Access of Courts 
	  
The Tribunal was also called upon to determine whether the Applicants have been 
deprived of their right to access the courts and whether they have been denied a fair 
hearing due to Amendment 17.163 On this question the Tribunal found that the 
applicants were indeed denied access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing, 
which are crucial elements of the rule of law, and that Section 16B (3) (a)164 was in 
violation of Article 4 (c) of the Treaty.165 Firstly, in 2007, the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe issued its decision pertaining to the constitutionality of Amendment 16A 
and 16B.166 The Court held that, ‘the land reform is a non-justiciable political 
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question and that the Constitution could legally deny a right to access courts to 
challenge land acquisitions’.167 While the decision in the Supreme Court was still 
pending, the SADC Tribunal held that Amendment 16A and 16B violated 
international law because those provisions deny individuals the fundamental right to 
access courts and have their case heard.168  
Secondly, the Treaty stipulates that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear cases 
involving individual human rights,169 and it is a fact that Zimbabwe has accepted 
SADC Tribunal`s validity by appointing one of its officials to act as a judge in the 
Tribunal. The Supreme Court accepted the validity of the Tribunal because it 
believed that the Tribunal is a legitimate judicial institution of SADC, however, the 
Supreme Court may not adhere to or enforce the decisions of the Tribunal if it 
considers such decision repugnant to public policy. As a matter of fact, the ruling of 
the Tribunal was against public policy in Zimbabwe because compulsory acquisition 
of land has become public policy covered by the land policy and this was enabled by 
numerous amendments to the Land Acquisition Act to accommodate the new socio-
political developments. Though the processes and legal procedures relating to the 
land policy in Zimbabwe are largely unconstitutional and punitive, confusing and 
disorderly, the fact remains that it is a public policy. Thus, notwithstanding the 
centrality of the land issue in Zimbabwe, land reform policy approaches have largely 
been a case of ‘implement first, formulate and legislate later”.170 Be that as it may, 
the SADC Treaty contains an instruction that member states should avoid taking 
decisions or measures which are detrimental to the principles set out in the Treaty.171 
Thus, the Tribunal found correctly that the applicants have been deprived of their 
rights to the courts and that their rights to a fair hearing have been breached by 
Amendment 17.172 The Tribunal accordingly discussed the right to access to the 
courts making extensive reference to decisions of other regional and national courts 
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as well as quasi-judicial bodies who has the capacity to rule on matters pertaining to 
human rights.173  
More so, the Tribunal further pointed out that the right of access to the courts 
is also contained in most international human rights treaties. For instance, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides in Article 7 (1) (a) as 
follows: ‘Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises: The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts violating 
his fundamental rights…’ 174 Hence, the Tribunal was satisfied that indeed the 
applicants were able to establish that the respondent has breached the applicant`s 
fundamental rights to access the court and to have their cause heard within the 
national courts. The Respondents were therefore found to have acted in breach of 
Article 4 (c) and 6(2) of the SADC Treaty  
(iii) Racial Discrimination  
	  
The applicants also raised the issue of racial discrimination in its submission to the 
Tribunal in which they argued that the acquisition of land is based on racial 
discrimination because it targets white Zimbabwean farmers only175. The applicants 
further argued that Amendment 17 was intended to facilitate or implement the land 
reform policy of the Government of Zimbabwe based on racial discrimination176. 
Furthermore, the Applicants went on to argue that, even if Amendment 17 made no 
mention of race and colour of the owners of the land to be acquired, that does not 
necessarily mean that the legislation is not based on considerations of race or colour 
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since only white owned farms were targeted by the Amendment.177 There is a clear 
legislative intent directed only at white farmers. According to the applicants, the 
Amendment strikes at white farmers only and no other rational categorization is 
apparent therein.178  
The Tribunal then weighed the allegations made by the applicants against the 
provisions of the Treaty which provides that; SADC and Member States shall not 
discriminate against any person on grounds of gender; religion, political views, race, 
ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability, or such other ground as may be 
determined by the Summit.179 Of relevance in this case is the reference to ‘race’  -  
the applicants maintain they have been discriminated against because Amendment 17 
was designed in such a way that only ‘whites’ will be targeted.180  
First of all, a review of the provisions of Amendment 17 is of importance at 
this stage.  Section 16A provides that the ‘… following factors shall be regarded as 
of ultimate and overriding importance…’181 and that ‘…the people of Zimbabwe 
must be enabled to reassert their rights and regain ownership of their land…’182 The 
Constitution further placed the obligation to pay the compensation to those whose 
farms have been expropriated on the former colonial power which in this instance is 
Britain.183 More so, the Constitution further provided that, where the land is acquired 
compulsorily and where compensation has to be made, the following factors have to 
be considered including ‘the history of the ownership, use and occupation of the 
land’184 and ‘the price paid for the land when it was last acquired’185 among others. It 
is a fact that most of the farm owners in Zimbabwe were ‘white’ commercial farmers 
who owned large tracts of land and it is conceivable to conclude that the Amendment 
was technically designed to ‘prey’ on white farmers. The reference to ‘the history of 
the ownership’ was strategically used in order to stress and identify that the land was 
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acquired during the colonial era and as such the constitution sought to ‘correct’ the 
injustices of colonialism. However, though the argument appears plausible and 
reasonable, it cannot be applauded because it perpetuates a gross violation of 
fundamental principles of law and of the very obligations to uphold the rule of law 
and  ‘not to discriminate’ on any of those ground mentioned, ‘race’ included, which 
Zimbabwe  agreed to be bound by when it signed the SADC Treaty.  
The Tribunal referred to a number of international instruments which prohibit 
discrimination.186 The Tribunal was so specific as to mention that ‘discrimination on 
the basis of race is also outlawed by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (the Convention)’. It is worth noting that the Respondent 
(Zimbabwe) has acceded to both Covenants, the African Charter and the Convention 
and, by doing so, is under an obligation to respect, protect and promote the principle 
of non-discrimination and must therefore prohibit and outlaw any discrimination 
based on the ground of race in its laws, policies and practices.187 Furthermore, the 
Tribunal found that the respondent breached Article 6(2) of the Treaty which enjoins 
SADC and Member States, including the Respondent, not to discriminate against any 
person on the stated grounds, one of which is race. It also came to the attention of the 
Tribunal that the word “discrimination” was not defined in the Treaty and the 
Tribunal took it upon itself to define the word ‘discrimination’.188  
A number of international documents were considered and a particular 
reference was made to General Comment 16 of 2005 of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right of men and women to the equality 
of all economic, social and cultural rights where it concurred with the definition of 
discrimination which is; ‘Indirect discrimination occurs when a law, policy or 
programme does not appear to be discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect 
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when implemented’.189 On the forgoing question, the Tribunal concluded that the 
effects of Amendment 17 have had an unjustifiable and disproportionate impact 
upon a group of individuals distinguished by race such as the Applicants and it 
considered that the differentiation of treatment meted out to the Applicants also 
constitutes discrimination as the criteria for such differentiation are not reasonable 
and objective but arbitrary and are based primarily on considerations of race.190 
Finally, pertaining to the question of discrimination, the Tribunal found that 
Zimbabwe has breached its Treaty obligations by discriminating the white land 
owners on the basis of race. The Tribunal consequently held that the expropriation 
policy and it nature constituted discrimination in an indirect way because the 
differential treatment created by that policy was, in one way or another, directed at 
and felt mostly by white farm holders and it cannot be said it serve a legitimate 
purpose. However, if the land policy had resulted in fair distribution of farmland to 
the very landless and poor, and characterised by fair compensation, the purpose of 
the compulsory land grabs by the government of Zimbabwe would have been 
legitimate, reasonable and proportionate. Nevertheless, as it stood, the acquisition of 
land by the government had created an unjustifiable and disproportionate impact 
upon persons distinguished by race in violation of Article 6(2) of the SADC 
Treaty.191 Therefore, following this observation the Tribunal reached the following 
conclusion; 
 
‘Since the effects of the implementation of Amendment 17 will be felt by the 
Zimbabwean white farmers only, we consider [that] although Amendment 17 
does not explicitly refer to white farmers ... its implementation affects white 
farmers only and consequently constitutes indirect discrimination or de facto or 
substantive inequality.’192  
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Amendment 17 did not only oust the right to access courts for those whose farms 
have been expropriated for agricultural and resettlement purposes, but it also denied 
them the right to compensation. The respondent did not dispute the entitlement of the 
applicants to compensation; it however, argued that the independence agreement 
reached in 1978 in London provided that payment of compensation for expropriated 
land for resettlement purposes would be paid by the former colonial power, 
Britain.193 The Tribunal responded to this argument by indicating that in ordinary 
sense and in international law, it is the expropriating state that should pay 
compensation and as such the respondent should shoulder the responsibility of 
paying compensation to the applicants for their expropriated lands. It is the right of 
the Applicants under international law to be paid, and the correlative duty of the 
Respondent to pay, fair compensation.194  
Furthermore, though it has been clearly stipulated in the Constitution that, the 
government will not be responsible for the compensation of the expropriated land, 
the Tribunal held that the Respondent cannot rely on national law, to avoid an 
international law obligation to pay compensation.195 This obligation of the 
expropriating state should be maintained regardless of how the farms were acquired 
in the first place, provided that the Applicants have a clear legal title to them. 
Finally, the Tribunal held among other things that compensation should be paid 
fairly to the Applicants by the Respondent to compensate their expropriated farms.196 
In other words, it is settled law that; any expropriating state has an inherent 
obligation to pay compensation to those who have their property expropriated, 
irrespective of the cause of such expropriation and it is an intolerable irregularity for 
an expropriating state to shift this obligation to any other state. This conduct violates 
due process of law and breaches the right to compensation that is deeply embedded 
in the principles of law.  
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b) The findings of the Tribunal  
      
To this effect the Tribunal ordered the following; 
(1) That the Respondent is in breach of its obligations under Article 4 (c) 
and that, the Respondent is in breach of its obligations under Article 6 (2) of 
the Treaty;197 
(2) That Amendment 17 is in breach of Article 4 (c) and that; 
Amendment 17 is in breach of Article 6 (2) of the Treaty;198 
(3) That the Respondent is directed to take all necessary measures, 
through its agents, to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the 
lands of the Applicants, except for Christopher199 Mellish Jarret, Tengwe 
Estates (Pvt) Ltd. and France Farm (Pvt) Ltd. that have already been evicted 
from their lands, and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that no action 
is taken, pursuant to Amendment 17, directly or indirectly, whether by its 
agents or by others, to evict from, or interfere with, the peaceful residence on, 
and of those farms by, the Applicants,200 and 
(4) That the Respondent is directed to pay fair compensation, on or 
before 30 June 2009, to the three Applicants, namely, Christopher Mellish 
Jarret, Tengwe Estates (Pvt) Ltd. and France Farm (Pvt) Ltd.201 
c) The response of Zimbabwe 
	  
The Tribunal then granted the application sought by the applicants.202 However, 
Zimbabwe branded the Tribunals` ruling as an ‘exercise in futility’203 and the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe responded by quoting the words of Maxwell who 
reasoned that; ‘If there is one rule of construction for statutes and other documents it 
is that you must not imply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words 
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expressly used, ‘… if the language is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to 
it for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature.’204 
The renowned scholar went on to argue that; 
 
‘[w]here the language is plain and admits to but one meaning, the task of 
interpretation can hardly be said to arise. Where by the use of clear and 
unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the 
legislature; it must be enforced, however harsh or absurd or contrary to 
common sense the result may be’.205  
 
More so, foreign judgment had to meet certain conditions in Zimbabwe for it 
to be recognized and enforced; one of those conditions is that such judgement should 
not as a result violate public policy.206 Though the Supreme Court concurred that as 
a general rule, public policy would require Zimbabwe to comply with its 
international treaty obligations and the Tribunals as a result of such obligations, and 
it stressed that such factors should be balanced against public policy challenges 
specific to the case at hand. The fact that recognizing or enforcing the Tribunal’s 
decision made in the Campbell case would be obviously incompatible and contrary 
to the land reform policy envisaged in the Zimbabwean Constitution, which was also 
explicitly supported by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court.207 Therefore, given these 
circumstances, recognition of the Campbell decision would violate domestic public 
policy in Zimbabwe.208  
The court was defiant and not prepared to consider registering or enforcing the 
Tribunal’s order in the country. It is not surprising that the court refused to comply 
with the Tribunal’s order for it did not consider the Tribunal to be the court of law as 
it stated obiter dictum that, ‘[t]he taking away of the functions of judicial power and 
giving them to a Tribunal which is not a court of law is as valid an exercise of 
legislative power as the taking away of the functions and letting them lie dormant 
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without giving them to any other body to discharge.’209 More so, further beatings of 
white farm owners and their workers continued unrestricted, and expropriation of 
farms intensified despite the order made by the Tribunal.210  
When the beatings and torture continued to rage at large in 2008, the 
Applicants made an urgent application to the Tribunal in which it sought that the 
Tribunal should hold the government of Zimbabwe to be in breach and contempt of 
the Tribunal’s order. The Tribunal in this application rejected the defence 
contemplated by Zimbabwe which maintained that there was a state of lawlessness in 
the country and that the authorities were experiencing difficulties in preventing 
intimidation and violence. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the applicant.211  
Furthermore, the government never implemented the order made by the 
Tribunal after such an application and amidst incessant intimidation and 
expropriation of land, the applicants once again, for the third time, approached the 
Tribunal with a similar application to hold the respondent in breach of the Tribunal’s 
order.212 However, this time around the government refused to participate in the 
proceedings and again the Tribunal found against the respondent.213  
Further, the Tribunal, pursuant to Article 32 (5) of the Protocol,214 referred 
Zimbabwe’s repeated refusal to enforce the Tribunal decision to the Summit for it to 
impose appropriate action and on each occasion the Summit failed to act.215 During 
the 2010 Summit, the SADC Secretariat commissioned an independent review of the 
Tribunal and the review confirmed and vindicated the decision of the Tribunal.216 
The review confirmed that the Tribunal has legitimate authority to deal with 
individual human rights petitions;217 that the decisions of the Tribunal were binding 
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and enforceable within the territories of Member states;218and  that the Tribunal was 
lawfully established in terms of the Tribunal Protocol.219 The Tribunal further 
pointed out that SADC countries waived the requirement to ratify the Protocol which 
became part of the Treaty by agreement and binding on all member states 220 and that 
Zimbabwe`s participation in the Tribunal`s proceedings and the nomination of the 
judge to serve in the Tribunal, preclude it from arguing that the Tribunal was not 
legal. The review finally pointed out that a state may not rely on its constitution or 
national laws as a defence against a violation of an international obligation.221 The 
Summit in 2011, notwithstanding the findings and conclusions of the review, 
announced that it would maintain the suspension of the Tribunal from hearing any 
pending or new cases until the Tribunal Protocol had been reviewed and such 
revision should be approved by the heads of state.222 The Summit further mandated 
the region`s Ministers of Justice and Attorney-generals to initiate a process of 
amending the relevant SADC legal instruments.223 The Summit also resolved that it 
would not reappoint or replace the Tribunal judges whose term of office had 
expired.224 This action and decision of the Summit has completely embroiled the 
functioning of the Tribunal.  
This has been a concern in the international arena and it has attracted a 
plethora of scholars who have commented rather negatively on the manner in which 
the Summit dealt with the matter at hand225 and made a lot of noise in the media.226 
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Amidst this turmoil, some of the applicants in the Campbell case approached the 
South African Court to enforce the Tribunal’s decision to award legal costs to 
them.227 The detail of the arguments and the ruling of the court in this case are 
provided in the next section. 
 
III Fick case(s) 
	  
In one segment of the tribunal`s proceedings, the Tribunal ordered Zimbabwe to pay 
the legal costs of the respondents which Zimbabwe declined. The respondents 
therefore applied to the North Gauteng High Court in South Africa to have the costs 
order recognised in South Africa. Though Zimbabwe declined to participate in the 
proceedings, an order was made by default recognizing the order of the Tribunal. 
The High Court then issued a writ of execution authorising the Sheriff for the district 
of Cape Town to attach immovable properties belonging to Zimbabwe and to sell 
them in execution of the Tribunal’s costs order. The High Court granted the 
following order by default on 25 February 2010;  
‘It is ordered that the rulings by the [SADC] Tribunal delivered on 28 
November 2008 and 5 June 2009 are declared to be registered i.e. recognised 
and enforceable in terms of article 32 of the Protocol of the SADC Tribunal by 
the High Court of South Africa, and the quantum of the costs pursuant to the 
latter ruling is to be declared as determined by the Registrar of the SADC 
Tribunal in the allocator attached, namely US$ 5 816.47 and ZAR 112 
780.13.’228 
 
Believing that the properties were to be sold under the authority of the 
respondent`s writ, Zimbabwe applied urgently to the North Gauteng High Court for 
relief aimed at setting it aside.229 Zimbabwe then commenced a fresh application for 
rescission of the order that had been made by Rabie J recognizing the order of the 
Tribunal.230 Later it launched yet a further application for rescission of the order that 
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had been made by Tuchten J.231 The three applications – the application to set aside 
the writ, the application to rescind the order of Rabie J, and the application to rescind 
the order of Tuchten J – were consolidated and came before R D Claassen J, who 
dismissed them.232Hence, Zimbabwe appealed against this judgement in the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal233 which also dismissed the appeal.234  
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, Zimbabwe approached the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa with an application in which it required the 
Court to determine whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to enforce the costs 
order made by the Tribunal.235 For the reasons outlined in the later stage of this 
discussion, the Constitutional Court also dismissed the application.236  
When the applicants approached the High Court in South Africa, they were 
adamant that they would win although the public policy argument against 
enforcement of the judgment had prevailed before the Zimbabwean High Court.237 
They noted that ‘South African domestic public policy is clearly in favour of 
registering the rulings,’ since South Africa ‘abhors racial discrimination [and] 
arbitrary expropriation.’238 The application was successful and the order was granted 
against Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe made an application for the rescission of the Gauteng 
High Court order239 and in its defence; Zimbabwe argued that, the service order 
handed down by the High Court (Gauteng) was in violation of Zimbabwe’s 
sovereign immunity against action in South African courts in terms of the Foreign 
States Immunities Act240 (Immunities Act)241. More so, Zimbabwe argued that the 
registration order lacks validity on two grounds. First, that the Tribunal did not have 
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jurisdiction to entertain the farmers’ challenge to Zimbabwe’s land reform policy.242 
Secondly, the High Court (Gauteng) lacked jurisdiction because the Treaty and the 
Tribunal Protocol were not approved by the South African Parliament and could not 
therefore enforce the costs order.243 The Court dismissed the application stating 
among other reasons that, ‘the applicant, having signed the Treaty and subsequently 
adopted it, it is not for the applicant to now renege on its obligation to fully import 
the obligations of the Treaty and the Protocol. Under those circumstances, it seems 
that the applicant has clearly waived its right to immunity in terms of the Treaty and 
or the Foreign State Immunity Act’.244 Discontented with the dismissal of its 
application in the high court, Zimbabwe approached the Supreme Court of South 
Africa.245The Supreme Court rejected Zimbabwe`s arguments and stated that, 
‘..Zimbabwe had waived its immunity by expressly submitting itself to the SADC 
Treaty and the [Tribunal] Protocol’.246 It held further that the Amending Agreement 
was adopted by the prescribed majority, including Zimbabwe.247 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the Tribunal Protocol did not need to be ratified by 
Member States to be binding. It also dismissed the argument that the Tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction on the additional basis that Zimbabwe’s submission to the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction was sufficient for the purpose of the enforcement of the costs order in 
South Africa.248  
Disgruntled by the dismissal of its appeal in the Supreme Court, Zimbabwe 
approached the South African Constitutional Court.249 Zimbabwe argued that the 
South African Parliament did not approve the Treaty in terms of section 231 of the 
Constitution and that non-compliance is a bar to the enforcement of the costs order in 
South Africa. For these reasons, Zimbabwe concludes that orders of the Tribunal 
cannot be registered and enforced by South African courts.250 The Court rejected this 
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argument and stressed that the South African Parliament approved the Treaty in 1995 
and thus the Treaty and the Amended Treaty are thus binding on South Africa, at 
least on the international plane.251 Furthermore, the Court found that; 
 
‘Zimbabwe’s agreement to be bound by the Tribunal Protocol, including article 
32, constitutes an express waiver in terms of section 3(1) of the Immunities Act. 
It is a waiver by Zimbabwe of its right to rely on its sovereign immunity from 
the jurisdiction of South African courts to register and enforce decisions of the 
Tribunal made against it’.  
 
For these reasons and others mentioned in the case, the Constitutional Court 
dismissed the application. This therefore means the decision of the Tribunal was 
subsequently enforced in South Africa. It is clear that the decisions of the Tribunal 
can be enforced by the Member States through the common law procedure as has 
been demonstrated in the Fick case(s)252.  
 
IV Legal Analysis 
	  
Zimbabwe raised several defences in an attempt to exonerate itself and hence justify 
its violation of the common objective of SADC principles. Furthermore, Zimbabwe 
argued that the South African court has no jurisdiction over Zimbabwe because, one; 
South Africa has not ratified the Tribunal`s protocol and secondly; Zimbabwe is a 
country which deserves immunity in terms of the Foreign Immunity Act.253 Thus this 
section therefore seeks to provide a legal analysis on the issues discussed above and 
also on the defences raised by Zimbabwe against the decision of both the Tribunal 
and the South African Courts.  
Though it was a novel procedure of its kind, South African courts have 
demonstrated the possibility that the decisions of the Tribunal can be enforced and as 
such all member states must take this obligation as mandatory and of significance in 
as far as protection of human rights and the rule of law is concerned. The decision in 
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the Fick254 case marked a victory of the rule of law in the region and the muscle of 
the Tribunal in championing human rights emerged in an unprecedented way. The 
discussion above indicates two major obstacles to the enforcement of the Tribunal 
decisions within the national courts of member states and these are; lack of political 
will from the leaders of member states and an overrated sovereignty of states. This 
discussion will extensively engage with these two problematic issues in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
a) Political will 
	  
Though political will is rather a controversial subject, for the purposes of this 
discussion, it is important to begin by giving ‘political will’ a specific and narrow 
meaning. Political will, can be defined as ‘the determination of an individual 
political actor to do and say things that will produce a desired outcome’.255 The 
desired outcome in this instance probably refers to the objectives and principles 
envisaged in SADC Treaty. Promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law are fundamental principles of SADC Community which Zimbabwe has 
deliberately breached in the Campbell case.256 The collection of the events leading to 
the spurning of the Tribunal`s ruling by Zimbabwe indicates to any sound mind that, 
Zimbabwe as a Member State has lacked political will to act in line with the 
international objective of SADC Treaty.  
More so, though the Protocol provides seemingly viable enforcement 
mechanisms,257  the spurning of the Tribunal decision by the Zimbabwean 
government has revealed shaky relationships between the Tribunal and the domestic 
courts of the member states. This is a problem to be concerned about in  as  far  as  
the fundamental  principles  of  community  based  on  law  are  concerned. The 
failure by the respondent to comply with the Tribunal`s ruling represents not only the 
complexities on of the enforcement capacity of the Tribunal, but  also  an  
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impediment of the credibility of SADC law as whole and  a  threat to the continental 
agenda of integration. In essence, it is an unambiguous demonstration of political 
will that SADC Member states, Zimbabwe included, have signed and ratified the 
SADC Treaty. However, the authenticity of this will become questionable 
immediately when a Member State blatantly refuses to execute such political will 
when the need arises. Therefore, it can plausibly be concluded that, lack of political 
will has indeed contributed to the status quo of the Tribunal because of Zimbabwe`s 
lack of political will to comply with the decision of the Tribunal and its notorious 
refusal to maintain the principles of SADC which are non-discrimination, respect of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law.258  
b) Sovereignty 
	  
The problem is actually that within SADC region, member states cling to absolute 
sovereignty and erroneously use it as a shield against international legal obligations. 
Although sovereignty is often blurred, and too complex, it cannot be denied that it 
played, and continues to play a significant role in modern constitutional and 
international legal theory as well as in politics. It is not entirely the purpose of this 
section to discuss sovereignty as a whole; however it is important to make a brief 
reference to the concept of sovereignty in order to make a relevant analysis of the 
claim of sovereignty and immunity made by Zimbabwe when it appealed the 
decision of the North Gauteng High Court.259  
The ‘sovereign state’ is still the primary actor of the international 
community.260 Zimbabwe, just as the other fourteen SADC member states, is a 
sovereign state which possesses full legal personality. Sovereignty as a legal notion, 
integrates a political dimension which paradoxically often defies legal control. In 
other words, sovereignty as a legal concept is characterized by an uneasy tension 
between an effort to define and therefore limit the powers of the state  who claims to 
be sovereign, and that sovereign`s efforts to evade the control exerted by legal rules 
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and procedures, or to change the law according to state interest.261 However, this 
concept has continually evolved and developed to suit the modern political and 
economic paradigm. Sovereignty, which prevails in the 21st century, is more flexible 
and it states that member states are bound by those rules of law to which they have 
agreed, either by the conclusion of the Treaties or via custom.262 Wolfgang 
Friedmann identified sovereignty in the modern context as a classical system of 
international law - a ‘law of co-existence.’ Further he commented that ‘this move of 
international society, from essentially a negative code of rules of abstention to 
positive rules of cooperation…is an evolution of immense significance for the 
principles and structure of international law’.263  
Today, given the degree of interdependence of the relations between states, one 
cannot consider their sovereignty of states as absolute. More so, the SADC Theme 
document in 1992 raised a concern that integration left to market forces alone would 
not occur.264 Extension of the goal of integration was urgently required and states 
should give away some degree of sovereignty in order to create a vigorous 
mechanism which is necessary and relevant for regional decision making, 
coordination, execution and enforcement.265 Unfortunately, this model scheme was 
not supported at the beginning when the SADC deliberately refused to set up a 
collective system which will monitor state compliance with the Treaty’s provisions 
or domestic governance.266 The new organisation on politics, defence, and security 
co-operation, which was earmarked to oversee state performance, received rather 
insufficient recommendations as it was believed to be too intrusive.267 This proposal 
was dismissed by the ministerial committee and dubbed it as intolerable interference 
in domestic affairs.  
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However, the refusal by member states to comply with international legal 
commitments as shown above is not unique, states who sign/ratify regional and 
international human rights treaties frequently fails to honour their obligation at the 
end.  The question therefore is why is it so? Well, the reasons may vary greatly, but 
as for SADC, the political diversity, coupled with the State’s sheer commitment to 
traditional concept of sovereignty,268 also excludes the potential of having a feasible 
and effective Tribunal whose jurisdiction covers such aspects of human rights and 
the rule of law at large.  
It has been argued and rightly so, that in international law sovereignty is a term 
that is as ubiquitous as it is elusive.  It denotes freedom of action and while it is true, 
anyone would hardly argue that this freedom is unrestrained by international 
obligations.269 In many occasions sovereignty is simply misused as a smoke screen 
or as an excuse for violations of the law. It is maintained that sovereignty is not an 
absolute concept but simply a descriptive term that represents the most important 
participant and capacity of a particular state in international relations of the states. 
The fact that the states sometimes use the argument of sovereignty to resist 
international co-operation and to frustrate international obligation per se, detract 
from this fact270.  
More so, co-operation is vital especially in relation to international law and 
without co-operation it is inconceivable to achieve any agreement. Co-operation 
means there is an agreement to wade-off some sovereign powers in order to give the 
regional body some supreme power. In other words, co-operation is the most 
important practical demonstration of sovereignty.271 Therefore to provide an answer 
to the question raised, it suffices to mention that sovereignty is not enough of a 
defence to rise against obligations under international law. A renowned scholar272 
laments that  ‘[a]n absolute and irresponsible  sovereignty, the final  judge  of  its  
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own act, is in  international  relations  merely  a  figment  of  the  imagination, 
logically  impossible in the facts of practise, though its dead branches yet ramify 
throughout the entire field of international law, badly hampering  its growth.’273 This 
entails that sovereignty, though important, should not be used as a shield against 
community laws. 
 
c) Regional Integration Commitment Dishonoured 
	  
it is important to note that the objectives of SADC as a regional organisation is to 
attain economic growth and development which will in turn help in alleviating 
poverty and enhancing the quality of life of the Southern African people and to 
support those who are socially disadvantaged though regional integration.274 
Therefore, SADC as a regional bloc carries a significant role to play in the gradual 
achievement of the continental objective of integration,275which includes the 
speeding up of the political and socio economic integration of Africa on the basis of  
among other things, the observance of democratic principles, human rights, the rule 
of law as well as good governance.276  
It is clear therefore that the Tribunal has an important role to play within the 
region and it has a mandate to pursue regional integration through sound 
maintenance of the rule of law and legal order.277 However, it is unfortunate that the 
Tribunal, which should see to it that the commitment of regional integration is being 
pursued in a legal and acceptable manner, has been suspended, and this, does not 
bode well for integration. This therefore entails that, the whole agenda of integration 
has also been affected rather negatively. It was opined that; 
 
‘There are many positive aspects to the role and need for regional courts. In 
systems of integration there is a genuine need for an independent court with its 
own jurisdiction. Regional courts with wide jurisdiction strengthen the federal 
or common system. The court will have an interest in safeguarding the interests 
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and integrity of the common system. Furthermore, a court underlines that the 
common system is a system based on law and order and respect for the rule of 
law’.278 
 
More so, Mogoeng CJ stated that; ‘The purpose for the establishment of SADC 
was to achieve certain regional developmental goals. Some of the key objectives are 
set out in the Preamble to the Treaty as: a collective realisation of the progress and 
well-being of the peoples of Southern Africa; promotion of the integration of the 
national economies of Member States; the need to mobilise international resources 
and secure international understanding, support and cooperation; and, more 
importantly, ‘the need to involve the peoples of the region centrally in the process of 
development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, 
observance of human rights and the rule of law’.279  
In essence, the Tribunal acts as the wheel which drives the SADC Region 
towards its final goal of economic integration, and its suspension does not only pose 
a threat to this agenda, but it also affects the economic process of the region in a 
negative way in that it will scare out investors and private firms for the fear of no 
redress of their trade disputes because the Tribunal is inactive. More so, the long 
term consequences for investment, development and respect for the rule of law will 
be negative, while the benefits of freer trade and the certainty of a rules-based 
system will be undermined.280 Trade in SADC apparently takes place on the basis of 
discretions and ad hoc policy responses.281 A formal dispute settlement forum like 
the Tribunal promotes transparency and certainty. The private sector, firms, service 
providers, investors and consumers then know where they stand in case they 
consider doing business in the region.282 However, the status quo of the SADC 
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Tribunal does not allow this certainty and this violates the very agenda of integration 




The spurning of the Tribunal decision by the government of Zimbabwe has 
demonstrated the unwillingness of some member states to comply with some 
international legal obligations. As shown in the discussion above, SADC Countries 
have been implacably opposed to any transfer of sovereignty to the regional level. 
However, the Tribunal’s ruling posed a direct challenge to sovereignty, rejecting the 
validity of a constitutional provision approved by the Zimbabwean parliament and 
courts and refuting the lawfulness and legitimacy of the government’s approach to 
redress the land iniquities inherited from colonialism and white settler rule.284 
Despite the firm stance taken by the Tribunal against Zimbabwe, the Summit 
nevertheless went on to dissolve the Tribunal. The surprising aspect is that the 
Summit, from the beginning, agreed to set up the regional court and endowed it with 
the mandate to rule on disputes between citizens and states in relation to the 
application of the Treaty and other protocols thereto. Therefore, the de facto 
suspension of the Tribunal by the Summit will be discussed in the subsequent 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUSPENSION OF THE TRIBUNAL AND THE STUDY 
REVIEW 
	  
I INTRODUCTION   
	  
The Tribunal`s decision in the Campbell case was an unequivocal victory for the rule 
of law, democracy and human rights in the Southern African region. The Tribunal, in 
finding against the Zimbabwean government, had demonstrated the will to serve the 
region`s human rights agenda and indicated that it is a reliable and independent 
institution which is able to ensure the maintenance and implementation of the SADC 
legal order beyond individual or political interference. The stance taken by the 
Tribunal was not only ‘shocking’ to the region`s political leaders, but it was, to them, 
also an act of ‘undermining’ their political interest and solidarity. The reaction of the 
SADC Summit of the heads of state and government in 2010 has exposed the anger 
that the political leaders had against the tribunal. After the annual summit meeting in 
2010, Patrick Chinamasa (the then Minister of justice in Zimbabwe), announced that 
the Heads of State and government have suspended the Tribunal for six months 
pending the outcome of a review by the region’s justice Ministers and Attorneys-
generals.285 The Summit resolved that the SADC Secretariat would review the terms 
of reference of the Tribunal; however, the outcomes were not taken into 
consideration. Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the suspension of 
the Tribunal and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, the farmers approached the 
AU and it is therefore important to reflect the role of the African Commission and 
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights and its potential contribution in 
protecting the rule of law. Lastly, this chapter will also discuss the study review on 
the Tribunal conducted by Lorend Bartels in order to identify and analyse the plight 
of the rule of law and human rights in the SADC Region. 
 
II Suspension of the Tribunal  
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Zimbabwe viewed the Tribunal’s decisions as an intolerable interference in the 
country’s domestic affairs. In 2009 the then Zimbabwe`s Minister of Justice, Patrick 
Chinamasa, announced that his government had withdrawn from the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.286 He argued that the regional court was not legally constituted because 
its Protocol had not been ratified by two-thirds of the member states, a requirement 
that he said was stipulated in the Protocol.287 Though the Tribunal reported the 
matter to the summit for it to take appropriate action, the Summit failed to act.288 For 
Zimbabwe the Summit’s passivity was not sufficient, the government also wanted to 
ensure that the Tribunal’s rulings were rendered void. To this end, Chinamasa 
successfully lobbied his ministerial counterparts in other SADC countries to support 
Harare’s stance. In 2010, after the annual summit meeting, he announced that the 
Heads of State had suspended the Tribunal for six months pending the outcome of a 
review by the region’s Justice Ministers and Attorneys generals.289  
There are political and historical reasons for other member states to stand with 
Zimbabwe which date back to the colonial era. When the Tribunal referred 
Zimbabwe`s refusal to comply with its ruling, the Summit faced a stark choice: it 
could either defend the Treaty and the region, or it could support a member state 
whose president and ruling party had liberated their country from colonialism and 
thereafter assisted other liberation movements in Southern Africa.290 The decision to 
back Zimbabwe reflected SADC’s hierarchy of values, in terms of which sovereignty 
and regime solidarity take precedence over human rights and democracy. A 
complementary interpretation is that state interests prevail over the regional legal 
edifice.291 In 2011 the Namibian Minister of Justice, Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, made 
this point explicitly, explaining that the Tribunal was under review so that it better 
served the interests of member states: ‘What is cast in stone is our commitment to 
work together as a regional body, SADC. How we do so is not cast in stone and 
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should suit our collective interest. The instruments serve us, they are for us, and this 
is not a reversible position.’292  
In 2011, the Summit disregarded the findings and recommendations of the 
independent review and officially announced that it would maintain the moratorium 
on the regional court hearing any pending or new cases until the Tribunal Protocol 
had been reviewed and that it will not reappoint the Tribunal judges whose terms of 
office have expired293. This de facto suspension has completely paralysed the 
Tribunal`s functionality. The Tribunal judges wrote an angry letter to the Executive 
Secretary of SADC, arguing that the Summit’s decision amounted to dissolving and 
not merely suspending the court.294 This decision was illegal, ultra vires, and taken 
in bad faith. While the Summit was at liberty to amend the Treaty and the Tribunal 
Protocol according to the prescribed procedures, prior to making such amendments it 
could not legitimately limit the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, to which the Summit itself 
was subject, and it could not legitimately stop the Tribunal from hearing the cases 
before it. The judges concluded that the Summit’s action was a breach of the Treaty 
and the right of access to justice.295  
Norman Tjombe, a Namibian human rights lawyer, maintains that the Summit 
was never enthusiastic about the Tribunal, taking fifteen years from the signing of 
the 1992 treaty until the appointment of the Tribunal judges in 2007; throughout this 
period, “it was actually just international powers pushing for ‘the regional court’.296 
Judge Ariranga Pillay, the former chief justice of Mauritius, who headed the 
Tribunal at the time of its dissolution, shares Tjombe’s opinion. Pillay believes that 
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for SADC’s leaders, the Tribunal was a gambit ‘to get funds from the European 
Union and others’.297 Pillay was quoted as follows; 
 
[The Tribunal] gave off all the right buzz words, you know, ‘democracy, rule of 
law, human rights’ and then they [the leaders] got the shock of their lives when 
we said these principles are not only aspirational but also justiciable and 
enforceable.298 
 
Pillay is of the view that the Summit did not foresee that the Tribunal would 
actually function as a supranational authority and declare invalid the laws and 
policies of a Member State.299 In a startling collusion to dismantle the Tribunal, the 
President of the Republic of Tanzania, Jakaya M. Kikwete, was also quoted 
bemoaning the Tribunal stating that; ‘we are the creators of this monster and we said 
we thought we had created an animal which was proper, but no, we had created a 
monster’300 In essence, the leaders of Southern Africa were prepared to sign the 
Treaty and protocols because they did not anticipate any real consequences 
emanating from this. They paid no heed to the legal instruments and the Summit 
refrained from criticizing and taking action against them when they breached those 
instruments.301 Indeed, as will be shown below, the SADC heads of state closed 
ranks in solidarity with Zimbabwe.302 
       
III The Study Commissioned by the SADC Secretariat 
	  
During the SADC Heads of Government meeting in Windhoek in August 2010, 
President Mugabe, being aware of the violation of human rights in the Campbell 
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case, vied to block any discussion of Zimbabwe and its human rights record. 
Members of the SADC Secretariat issued press statements insisting that Zimbabwe 
would be on the agenda, but during the course of discussions the issue was 
avoided.303 The Summit communique stated that it was decided by the Summit ‘that 
a review of the role, functions and terms of reference of the SADC Tribunal should 
be undertaken and concluded within six months’.304, Joao Samuel Caholo, Deputy 
Executive Secretary of the SADC, told journalists that the Tribunal would not be 
able to conclude any ongoing cases or take on any new ones before the end of the 
review process that was to be carried out by SADC Justice Ministers.305  
Therefore, pursuant to this review plan, the SADC Secretariat then appointed 
Lorand Bartels to conduct an independent review of the Tribunal and its legal 
powers, which was concluded on April 2011.306 The report broadly confirmed the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and its legal authority and concluded that SADC Member 
States were, by suspending the Tribunal, in violation of their international legal 
obligations.307 A similar view was expressed by Professor Gerhard Erasmus, who 
argued that the suspension was ‘unlawful in terms of SADC legal instruments and 
international treaty law’ and that simply altering the Tribunal Protocol would not 
alter the 2001 Amended SADC Treaty that clearly delegated powers to the 
Tribunal.308 Surprisingly, the response to the Bartels Report from an extraordinary 
SADC summit at Windhoek in May 2011 was to continue with the suspension of the 
SADC Tribunal. However, when questioned during press conference whether details 
of these reports would be publicised309, the Executive Secretary of SADC, Tomaz 
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Salomao, was adamant that ‘neither the media nor SADC citizens needed to know’ 
their contents.310  
It is therefore the purpose of this section to discuss and analyse the findings as 
made by Bartels.  In the report, Bartels dealt with various aspects of the Tribunal 
including inter alia; SADC law and national laws, the human rights mandate of the 
Tribunal, jurisdiction of the Tribunal, enforcement of the Tribunal`s decision, 
impartiality and independence of the Tribunal, access to justice and the consent of 
member states to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. These aspects will be dealt with 
separately. 
a) SADC Law and national laws 
	  
First of all, the report revealed that SADC members in concluding the SADC Treaty 
established a ‘community’ under international law. Therefore as an international 
organization it is governed by international law and, within its powers, generates 
norms with the status of international law. The nature of an international 
organization is norm based, and the most significant result of this is that a state 
which is a member of that organization may not rely on its national laws (including 
norms of constitutional status) as a defence to a violation of an international 
obligation.311 It follows therefore that, if it is the mere existence of a SADC member 
state’s national law that violates a SADC norm, that Member State must bring that 
law into line with the SADC norm.312  
Following this argument, the report stressed that Zimbabwe was then under an 
obligation to revoke the SADC-inconsistent elements of its legislation. In essence, 
what Bartels suggested is that, Section 16A and 16B of Amendment 17313 is 
inconsistent with the SADC Treaty and as such it is desirable to bring it into 
conformity with the Treaty and other international instruments. Amendment 17 
exempts the government of Zimbabwe from its obligation to pay compensation for 
agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement314 and those who are 
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affected by that provision shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of 
the land by the State, and no court shall entertain any such challenge.315 These 
provisions are in violation of Article 4 (c) of the Treaty which obliges member states 
to respect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
b) Human Rights 
 
Though the preamble of the SADC Treaty is mindful of the need to involve the 
people of the region, centrally, in the process of development and integration, 
particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights 
and the rule of law, SADC has failed to live up to its promises as can be witnessed 
by the disbandment of the Tribunal. Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty states that 
‘SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the principles of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law among others. Bartels concluded that Article 4 
(c) prima facie constitutes a binding obligation. The report has rejected the other 
objections raised against this view, stating that the objection that ‘the norms referred 
to as ‘principles’  are of non-binding effect,’ ignores the longstanding usage in 
international law of the term ‘principles’ to refer to binding obligations.316 The report 
concluded that ‘it goes without saying that a simple reference to the principles of 
‘human rights’ is sufficiently clear to be interpreted and applied by any tribunal, 
especially when read in the light of more detailed applicable human rights norms.  
Therefore, the provision of the Treaty in respect of the principles of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law, are binding in nature and they cannot be 
derogated from or interpreted with less weight from the binding obligations. The 
arguments raised contrary to this view do not hold water, especially in relation to 
international organizations whose principle mandate is to promote and protect 
fundamental human rights, democracy and the rule of law. As such, there is no 
reason to doubt the correctness of the rulings in Campbell that Article 4(c) of the 
SADC Treaty constitutes an obligation binding on the SADC Member States.317  
c) Enforcement of the Tribunal`s Decisions 
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It is not in contention that the SADC Tribunal issues ‘decisions’ on matters within its 
jurisdiction which are final and binding,318 and it therefore entails that the SADC 
Tribunal has the power to make decisions as to whether a given party has violated a 
relevant obligation set in the Treaty or any other instrument thereto. However, what 
is not clear therefore is whether the Tribunal is also empowered to order specific 
performance of a treaty obligation owed to an individual (as opposed to one owed to 
a state), in the absence of an express power to this effect.319 Be that as it may, Bartels 
stated in the report that; it is axiomatic that states are obliged to comply with binding 
decisions of international tribunals, including any decision on remedies. This rule 
would apply by default, but it is reiterated expressly in the SADC Treaty and 
Tribunal Protocol. Decisions of the SADC Tribunal are stated to be binding and 
must be complied with.  
Following this fact, it is clear that the refusal by Zimbabwe to enforce the 
decision of the Tribunal was a gross violation, not only of its Treaty obligations to 
promote human rights, but also a blatant repudiation of international standards of the 
rule of law and democracy. The report reiterated that, ‘what is important is that 
Zimbabwe is obliged itself to comply with binding Tribunal decisions, a point that is 
best expressed in Article 32(2)320. The report went on to confirm that the result of the 
case321 is correct insofar as it demonstrates that the obligation to comply with a 
SADC Tribunal decision is independent of any obligation to enforce those decisions 
domestically’.322 
 
d) Impartiality and independence of the Tribunal 
	  
Bartels also identified something common with almost all international Tribunals 
and that is all the instruments establishing the SADC Tribunal make no mention of 
its independence. However, he noted a number of provisions that are designed to 
ensure that both the Tribunal and its Members are independent of public and private 
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sector interests, and that its Members discharge their duties impartially. There are a 
number of issues that have been raised in the report that may impair the 
independence of the Tribunal; I will briefly discuss these below; 
e) Budget of the Tribunal  
	  
The budget of the Tribunal is funded by the SADC Community323 and Bartels notes 
that ‘‘it is normal for the budgets of international tribunals to be funded from the 
general budget of the organizations to which they are attached, and also that this is 
subject to the overall control of the political organs of the organization”.324 However, 
the suggestion was made in the report which proposed the amendment of Article 33 
to provide for an independent funding mechanism. The automatic funding 
mechanism maybe be devised or forged in the Treaty in which it should stipulate that 
the budget for the Tribunal should be integrated into the SADC organization`s 
budget as a whole and it will then be directed automatically to the Tribunal. This 
proposal is desirable for two reasons; firstly, a lack of automatic funding can impair 
the functioning of a Tribunal and secondly, dependence on a political organ can have 
a negative impact on the independence of a tribunal and its judges.325  
f) Tenure and reappointment 
	  
The report identified that the present rules governing tenure and reappointment of 
SADC Tribunal Members which are contained in Article 6 (1),326 are manifestly 
insufficient. The protocol provides that; 
 
‘[t]he Members shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years and may only be 
re-appointed for a further term of five (5) years. However, of the Members 
initially appointed, the terms of two (2) of the regular and two (2) of the 
additional Members shall expire at the end of three (3) years. The Members 
whose term is to expire at the end of three (3) years shall be chosen by a lot to 
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be drawn by the Executive Secretary immediately after the first appointment.’ 
327 
 
The report identified two problems with this provision, firstly it is not specified 
how the decision to reappoint a Tribunal Member is to be made; secondly, nothing is 
said about the mechanism for requesting a reappointment.328 Consequently, these 
ambiguities, he opined, affect the independence of judges and this is unacceptable 
for a judicial arm of the community. He therefore recommended that there is a need 
to amend Article 6(1) to provide for automatic reappointment of SADC Tribunal 
Members unless the Summit decides otherwise. 
Therefore, in a nutshell, the report made the following findings:329 
• The SADC Tribunal has the legal authority to deal with individual 
human rights petitions. SADC Community law should be supreme to domestic 
laws and constitutions. 
• Decisions of the SADC Tribunal should be binding and enforceable 
within the territories of all SADC member states. 
• The SADC Tribunal was legally established in terms of the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol. 
• The SADC states waived the requirement to ratify the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol which became a part of the SADC Treaty by agreement and 
is binding on all SADC member states. 
• Zimbabwe may not state that the Tribunal was not legally constituted 
when they participated in all the proceedings of the SADC Tribunal and 
nominated a judge for appointment. 
• A Member State may not rely on its national laws (including norms of 
constitutional status) as a defence against a violation of an international 
obligation. 
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IV The Role of the African Commission and the African Court of Human and 
            Peoples’ Rights in Pursuit of the Rule of Law  
	  
There are limited alternative mechanisms for dispute settlement on a regional level 
that are available at present in as far as human rights disputes are concerned. The 
most reliable and available mechanisms are the African Commission and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).330 All SADC members have ratified 
the African Charter, which provides for a monitoring body in the form of the African 
Commission.331 Its purpose is to receive complaints from members concerning the 
violation of the African Charter mainly from States against another State, or by 
individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) against one or more 
State.332 In case of serious human rights violations, the commission will only make a 
factual report, accompanied by its findings and recommendations; however, the 
recommendations of the African Commission are non-binding due to the fact that it 
is a quasi-judicial body.333 
The suspension of the Tribunal has ignited a considerable criticism across the 
region and in the international legal community at large. The disgruntled farmers 
took the matter upon them and approached the African Commission in which they 
sought an order that would ensure the SADC Tribunal would be reconstituted and 
continue to function in all respects as established by Article 16 of the SADC Treaty. 
At the 52nd Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights held at Yamoousskro, Cote d’Ivoire, the African Commission ruled that the 
complaint lodged with it on behalf of Zimbabwean farmers Luke Tembani and Ben 
Freeth against 14 heads of state of SADC countries was admissible.334 The decision 
of the Commission is a significant breakthrough in a legitimate campaign to restore 
the rule of law in Zimbabwe and to restore the SADC Tribunal which will have the 
capacity to vindicate and protect human rights.  
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Procedurally, the Commission may, after considering a matter before it, make 
recommendations as it deem useful to the Assembly.335 However, the 
communications made by the commission relate only to cases ‘of a series of serious 
or massive violations of human and people’s rights’.336 The Commission, after 
making some consideration, shall draw the attention of the Assembly to the latter 
cases337 and the Assembly may then request the Commission to undertake a study 
and generate a factual report with findings and recommendations.338  
The primary purpose of the African Commission is to promote human and 
peoples' rights339 and in particular to co-operate with other African and international 
institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples' 
rights340 and to interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a 
state party, an institution of the Organization of African Unity or an African 
organisation recognised by the Organization of African Unity.341 Furthermore, the 
Commission is not a substitute for the domestic courts; the commission can only 
decide on the matters brought before it and when doing so it should ensure that all 
local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is clear to the 
commission that to follow appropriate procedures would unduly prolong the 
achievement of a remedy.342 More so, the Commission should draw its inspiration 
from international law on human and peoples' rights, more particularly from the 
provision of different African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United 
Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights, as well 
as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the specialised agencies 
of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members.343  
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The African Commission can refer a case to the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR) at any time during its proceedings in relation to those 
countries that have ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘the Protocol Establishing the Court’).344 While the African Commission has 
jurisdiction over all states which have ratified the African Charter, the ACHPRs only 
has jurisdiction over those African states which have — in addition — ratified the 
Protocol Establishing the Court.345 So although the ACHPRs have the power to make 
binding decisions,346 there are few states subjected to its jurisdiction as compared to 
those who are members of the African Commission.347 
Therefore, it is clear that the two bodies; the commission and the ACHPRs, 
have an important role to play on the African continent, more especially in the 
southern part of the continent where the SADC Tribunal is dysfunctional. 
Furthermore, the Commission, state parties and African Intergovernmental 
Organisations are entitled to submit cases before the Court348 all in pursuit of the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law. Although other matters concerning 
trade and security may not be brought before these two bodies, it is encouraging that 
human rights violations still have an alternative platform on which they can be 
addressed. Therefore, this implies that the fact that the farmers brought the case to 
the African Commission may result in adjudication by the ACHPR since. The AC 
may refer a case to the ACHPRs. Furthermore, this is an indication that African 
Commission and the ACHPRs may act as members of the global network of courts 
which may be relied upon in order to strengthen human rights and ultimately the goal 
of regional integration in Africa. 
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It has been established that the suspension of the Tribunal is unlawful, ultra vires and 
a gross violation of the right of access to justice. It is inconceivable for SADC to 
operate efficiently without the Tribunal. In essence, what it means is that most of the 
SADC instruments will not be legally enforceable as long as the suspension of the 
Tribunal is still in place. Furthermore, Bartels in his report, found the Tribunal to be 
a legitimate court which has the necessary jurisdiction and capacity to make binding 
decisions on issues covered in the Treaty. He also confirmed its jurisdiction on 
matters which concern human rights, democracy and the rule of law and that its 
decisions are enforceable within the domestic courts. It is therefore a plausible 
conclusion that the findings made by the Tribunal in the case of Campbell was 
wholly correct and that Zimbabwe`s conduct was reprehensible and unacceptable for 
the Community based on law. Be that as it may, it is my opinion that, in order to 
serve the interest of justice and the agenda of integration from being threatened; the 
suspension of the Tribunal should be lifted as soon as possible. The next chapter will 






















The research has extensively discussed and analysed various aspects of the Tribunal 
and presented it as an important judicial institution of the SADC region. In doing so, 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the enforcement of Tribunal decisions, instruments 
governing the power of the Tribunal and the individual’s locus standi before the 
Tribunal, are some of the aspects discussed in chapter two.  
Secondly the Campbell case, being a famous and first case before the Tribunal 
which involved a human rights violation by the Zimbabwean government, has been 
discussed and analysed in chapter three. The Tribunal ruled against Zimbabwe and 
found in favour of the applicants. The Tribunal stated among other reasons that the 
compulsory acquisition of agricultural land without compensation as provided by 
Amendment 17 of the Zimbabwean Constitution349 was a violation of the Treaty`s 
basic principles to respect and protect human rights. More so, the Tribunal also 
found that, Amendment 17 violated Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty350 which 
prohibits discrimination on any grounds including race, as it has been proved that the 
Amendment 17 was designed to target white owned farms only. Hence the Tribunal 
ordered Zimbabwe not to continue with land grabs and to compensate those whose 
farms had already been confiscated.  
The discussion in previous chapters also indicated Zimbabwe`s refusal to 
enforce the decision of the Tribunal. The decision of the Tribunal against Zimbabwe 
signalled the demise of the regional court as the political leaders of SADC member 
states colluded to suspend the Tribunal in 2011. The suspension of the Tribunal is 
discussed in chapter four of this dissertation. After a de facto suspension of the 
Tribunal, an independent review on the Tribunal was commissioned which had to 
recommend on the terms of reference of the Tribunal. The study, headed by Lorend 
Bartels from Cambridge University, concluded that the Tribunal is properly 
constituted and its decisions are binding and valid. Subsequently, the farmers 
brought the case to the AU for its consideration. It is possible that the AU 
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Commission may refer it to the ACHPRs. Thus, the saga may continue on the 
regional level and may provide interesting perspectives on the relationship between 
RECs and the AU in Africa. Therefore, it is the primary purpose of this chapter to 
provide recommendations in relation to the issues raised by previous chapters in 
order to ensure that the impasse concerning the Tribunal maybe resolved. 
II Recommendations 
	  
 a) Sovereignty  
	  
The discussion in chapter 3 indicated that the Member States of the SADC are 
unwilling to relinquish some of their sovereignty to the sub-regional organisation. 
However, it should be stressed that the SADC organisation has been established by 
the sovereign governments of its member states. It is this expression of sovereignty 
that made the SADC a reality. Therefore using sovereignty as a tool to dishonour 
regional legal obligation is erroneous and it is not convincing in the legal sense.  
In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, the word “sovereignty” is a   
complex, but not absolute concept. Sovereignty does not only accord states with 
rights but also implies obligations as required by international law.351 It is not the 
purpose of this section to discuss sovereignty entirely, however it is important to 
point out that; acceptance of almost any treaty involves a transfer of a certain amount 
of decision-making authority away from states, and towards some international 
institution.352  
SADC member states should realise that sovereignty should not be abused in 
order to excuse non-compliance with international law obligations. More so, member 
states should not be allowed to invoke their national law or constitution as a 
justification for not respecting their international obligations. Acceding to the SADC 
treaty implies that member states incur international law obligations which will 
mould their sovereignty. 
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b) Member State to embrace the political will to enforce the Tribunal Decisions 
 
Chapter three discussed political will as one of the wanting attributes of the SADC 
leaders as they are not prepared to both implement and respect the obligations placed 
upon them by the Treaty. However, the Treaty does provide for sanctions against 
members that ‘persistently fail, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed 
under this Treaty’,353 or when they ‘implement policies which undermine the 
principles and objectives of SADC’.354 The Zimbabwe saga and that country’s 
failure to comply with the SADC Tribunal’s rulings on its human rights violations 
have revealed the weakness in this arrangement.355 The Summit was not prepared to 
act against Zimbabwe; instead, it decided to appoint a consultant to investigate the 
jurisdiction and terms of reference of the SADC Tribunal. Consequently the 
functioning of the Tribunal has been suspended and the terms of the judges 
(members of the Tribunal) have not been renewed.356  
It is apparent that there is no political will to enforce the provisions for 
sanctions against members who violate their obligations under the Treaty. However, 
unless provided otherwise in the Treaty, summit decisions are taken by consensus,357 
giving the member in violation of its obligations a veto over any sanctions. This is a 
major flaw in the system.  Furthermore, it has been proved that the real problem does 
not lie in the provisions of the Treaty; but it is the subsequent unwillingness of 
member states to respect the applicable legal instruments and to comply with 
obligations. The political will to comply with SADC law is absent. Therefore, it is 
my recommendation that sanctions should be stipulated in the Treaty and they 
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should not be taken by consensus. Furthermore, states should not adopt instruments 
if they do not have the political will and intention to comply. 
 
c) Reinstating the Tribunal with its Jurisdiction on Individual Locus standi  
 
Chapter three of this dissertation has extensively discussed the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal and the individual`s locus standi before the Tribunal. It also discussed both 
the scope and the basis of the Tribunal`s jurisdiction where it demonstrated that the 
Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes between member states and between natural 
or legal persons and member states. These provisions indicate a strong desire by the 
Protocol to offer individuals an opportunity to access the Tribunal on the condition 
that they have exhausted all other local remedies.  
However, recently the SADC Summit for Heads of State and government met 
in Lilongwe Malawi on the 18th of August 2012 to discuss, inter alia, the future of 
SADC Tribunal which was de facto suspended in 2010 following its ground-
breaking ruling against Zimbabwe in a matter involving human rights violations. The 
Summit report indicated that it has approved the extension of the mandate of the 
Ministers of Justice /Attorney Generals to enable them to revise the Protocol on the 
Tribunal in order to address the concerns raised by the Council of Ministers. What is 
disheartening though in this report is that the new negotiated Protocol on the 
Tribunal has a limited mandate which is only confined to the interpretation of the 
SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States.358 This is 
fundamentally erroneous and legally wrong for such a decision is in breach of the 
SADC international legal obligation to uphold the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights. It is also contrary to the SADC pledge to involve its citizens in participation 
in regional matters. This decision has curtailed the individual right to access the 
Tribunal despite the fact that all claims ever brought before the Tribunal have been 
brought by natural persons against either the States or the SADC itself.359  
It is therefore my recommendation that the Tribunal should be reinstated 
immediately and if possible it must also still maintain its mandate to protect human 
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rights in the region. Judges of the Tribunal must be re-appointed immediately.  The 
question still remains, should the locus standi be preserved? This is highly 
improbable since the Summit resolved to exclude individual locus standi.360 
However, it may be possible if other internal bodies like the ACHPRs intervene by 
way of giving an advisory opinion against such a move since the court is vested with 
the power to do so.361 
III CONCLUDING REMARKS 
	  
The pertinent questions in the SADC region are not about the formal legal dimension 
or provisions of the Treaty; it is mostly about poor implementation, lack of political 
will, relentless clinging to traditional sovereignty and insufficient monitoring of 
compliance. Furthermore, the analysis indicated an intricate misunderstanding of the 
basic legal consequences of the SADC Treaty among its members, and their apparent 
disrespect for legal obligations on a regional and international level. Though the 
conduct may be as a result of capacity deficits in Member States in relation to 
international law, it also suffices to hold that it is also a consequence of endemic 
disregard for the rule of law and democracy as such.362 As a matter of fact, the major 
pillar for dispute settlement in Southern Africa has been rendered inoperable, it may 
not at the moment entertain any type of disputes, whereas there are limited 
alternative avenues for dispute settlement available; the ACHPRs for instance.  
If the latter shortcomings require immediate resolve, it is not too late for the 
fifteen member state of SADC to indicate their commitment to SADC law and to 
develop a political will required for the objective of regional integration to be 
achieved. Preserving the status quo concerning the Tribunal will hamper regional 
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